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SUMMARY
GLOBAL MILITARISATION INDEX: PRESENTATION, CODEBOOK AND REFLECTION  \  BAYER, ALBERT, HAUK & MUTSCHLER
Measuring militarisation is complex. Since 2003 and retrospectively up to 
1990, BICC has been measuring militarisation worldwide with the Global  
Militarisation Index (GMI). The GMI’s approach is resource-based and meas-
ures the level of militarisation of a society by its allocation of resources by the 
state to the military in relation with other areas of society. By measuring the 
level of militarisation and the resulting time series annually, processes of mili- 
tarisation or demilitarisation of societies and regions can be mapped. 
In this Working Paper, for the first time, the authors present the Codebook 
which underpins the GMI. They also discuss the current methodology and 
possible additions in view of the changing framework conditions and new data 
sources. In particular, they discuss the inclusion of novel weapons systems but 
also the vision of a multi-dimensional concept of militarisation.   
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The following aspects will be discussed:
Focus the attention not only on state-centred but also  
private militarisation
The field of militarisation research has expanded  
beyond that of the armed forces as the central actor 
(for instance privatisation of security firms, militari-
sation of the police). Still, state militaries remain the 
most significant actors for militarisation processes. 
Even though the GMI is seeking to further differenti-
ate its concept and measure various militarisation 
processes, this should be implemented separately for 
analytical reasons. This is why the GMI will continue 
to measure militarisation with its state- and military- 
centred approach.  
Include small arms and light weapons if reliable data is 
available
Despite their far-reaching relevance as a means of  
organised violence, small arms and light weapons 
have not yet been included in the GMI. In contrast to 
major conventional weapons systems, small arms 
and light weapons are more often traded illegally. At 
the same time, they are often manufactured locally, 
which makes further transfers unnecessary. There is 
not sufficient reliable data on how many weapons 
can be found in arsenals of the armies around the 
world. By using a methodology based on estimates, 
the Small Arms Survey is currently arriving at fairly 
reliable data. But before small arms and light weapons 
can be included in the GMI, the extent to which they 
could become part of it retrospectively would have to 
be verified. 
Include novel weapons systems
Hybrid, network-centric or liquid warfare and the 
revolution in military affairs have fundamentally 
changed both military technology and warfare. Novel 
weapons systems and military technologies, such as 
military satellites, unmanned drones, as well as cyber- 
space as a new battlefield, play an increasingly im-
portant role. In all the areas addressed, the problem is 
The GMI’s unique feature is its  
resource-based approach
To measure and compare militarisation worldwide, 
BICC has been publishing the Global Militarisation  
Index (GMI) since 2003. Following a state-centred,  
relational resource-based approach, the GMI under-
stands militarisation as a description of the relative 
weight and importance of a state’s military apparatus 
in relation to its society as a whole as well as a pro-
cess that records the increase or decrease in the level 
of militarisation. This differentiates the GMI from 
other indices, such as the SIPRI Military Expenditure 
Database. Its sub-indices, the Expenditure-, the Per-
sonnel- and the Heavy Weapons Index put the finan-
cial, human and material resources allocated to the 
military in relation to other areas of society and the 
resources allocated to them. This gives us an unbiased, 
comprehensive and differentiated view of the con-
cept of militarisation.  
The GMI methodology is based on the 
weighting of indicators
The overall GMI represents a sum of its six weighted 
indicators. These are divided into three sub-indices: 
The Expenditure-, Personnel-, and Heavy Weapons 
index. We consider expenditures and personnel as 
the two most important determinants of militarisa-
tion. Therefore, the indices on expenditures and  
personnel are weighted by a factor of two against the 
third index, which represents the heavy weapons in 
the arsenals of a country. This weighting is indirectly 
derived from the scores of the indicators belonging to 
the respective sub-index.
The GMI has room for development 
New developments in warfare (such as drones, cyber-
war) suggest that the sub-indices of the GMI should 
be revisited. Moreover, new data sources offer the  
opportunity to further develop the Index and its 
sub-indices respectively. 
Central findings
GLOBAL MILITARISATION INDEX: PRESENTATION, CODEBOOK AND REFLECTION  \  BAYER, ALBERT, HAUK & MUTSCHLER
6 \ \ WORKING PAPER 3  \ 2021
to identify reliable and annual data. Only the USC  
Satellite Database is an exception that will, in all like-
lihood, allow us to include military satellites in the 
GMI in the next update.    
      If we succeed in complementing data from the 
Drone Databook and the annual SIPRI data on drone 
exports with our own research on drone production, 
we intend to include a state’s ability to deploy weap-
onised drones as of 2022. 
Develop a multi-dimensional approach to militarisation and 
organised violence
To be able to fully comprehend militarisation in its 
entirety and its complex implications on civil–military 
relations and organised violence, a three-dimensional 
concept of militarisation, which could be covered by 
three independent indices is necessary. While the 
GMI continues to record the material/military  
dimension, the Political Roles of the Military (PRM) 
dataset covers the political dimension and collects 
data on the influence of the military or rather the  
political control of the military. The creation of a new 
Military–Social Relations (MSR) Index would com-
plete the concept. A triad of GMI, PRM and MSR 
would not only allow us to identify different types of 
militarisation but to also study the complex interac-
tions between the dimensions and their implications 
on violence and regime stability in more detail. 
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The 20th century is sometimes referred to as the 
‘age of militarisation’ not only in view of the two 
World Wars but also the decades-long Cold War, char-
acterised by a global arms race and very high levels of 
militarisation on both sides of the Iron Curtain (Wal-
lensteen et al., 2019, XI). Since the end of the East–West 
antagonism, the concept of militarisation seems to 
have become less significant. Today, however, against 
the backdrop of increasing geopolitical tensions and 
rising military expenditures, this term is experiencing 
a renaissance and a conceptual reinterpretation, or 
rather expansion. Militarisation, on the one hand, is 
increasingly used in a spatial sense to describe a mili-
tary build-up at borders and border areas (Gohain, 
2018; Slack et al., 2016), in the Arctic (Kickert & Lacken- 
bauer, 2020; Exner-Pirot, 2020) or in outer space 
(Wowthorpe, 2004). On the other hand, the term is  
increasingly used in the context of police and state 
security forces to refer to the increasing adoption of 
military thinking as well as military tactics and equip- 
ment by these forces (see Flores-Macia & Zarkin, 2019; 
Bieler, 2016).
To measure and compare militarisation world-
wide, BICC has published the Global Militarisation  
Index (GMI) since 2003. With this BICC Working Paper, 
we explain the GMI in more detail, using a Codebook 
(V. 1.0). In a way, the Codebook is the academic  
operating manual for the GMI. In its most up-to-date 
version, it is a reflection of the currently adopted con-
cept of the GMI and the methodology and data sources 
underpinning the Index. In this sense, the Codebook is 
a ‘living document’. Regular updates of the Codebook 
will reflect changes to the Index. With debates around 
the conceptualisation of militarisation evolving since 
the first publication of the Index, and with other,  
additional data sources being available today, the  
authors also want to use this Working Paper to criti-
cally reflect on the status of the Index and identify 
possible improvements/ new developments. 
Introduction
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as the relative weight and importance of the state’s 
military apparatus in relation to its society as a whole. 
For this, the GMI compares spending on the military 
and military equipment with spending on other areas 
of society and thus allows statements about the social 
weighting of the military. It also complements expend-
iture on the military and armament of a society with 
information on the allocation of human and material 
resources to the military. These are also compared to 
resource expenditures in other areas of society, such 
as the health sector. Via its sub-indices, it thus allows 
a more detailed and more nuanced view of the con-
cept of militarisation.  
In doing so, it differs from other existing indices, 
such as the Military Expenditure Database published 
by the Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute SIPRI. This database covers military expendi-
tures from 1949 to 2020 and is updated annually.  The 
GMI also uses this data for its calculations. 
As described above, the GMI‘s concept is neither 
limited to military expenditures nor does it measure 
military power (such as the Global Firepower Index) 
or geopolitical influence or rather the capacity to in-
tervene (such as the Elcano Global Presence Index). 
In contrast to the World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) dataset of the US State 
Department, the GMI collects data yearly and does 
not cover longer periods at irregular intervals. This 
results in consistent timelines that allow us to look at 
and analyse the current development of militarisation 
globally or in certain regions. This is an important  
advantage, especially for mapping arms and escala-
tion dynamics.  
In most countries in the world, the military is the 
central state-run institution of organised violence.1  
Its main task is to defend the country and its popula-
tion against aggression and enemies, thus ensuring 
security. Accordingly, a strong military can be an  
indicator of a strained security situation in a country 
or a region. In such a situation, however, high milita-
risation tends to exacerbate the existing security  
dilemma and can drive regional arms dynamics. Yet 
in some cases, the main task of the military is to  
secure the power of the ruling elite and to subdue  
opposition. In these cases, a strong military is clearly 
problematic. A weak or dysfunctional military, by 
contrast, is often not in a position to prevent violence 
or the escalation of conflict as it cannot enforce or 
maintain its monopoly on the use of force. This, in 
turn, can have negative implications on the popula-
tion and the economic and social development of the 
country. To carry out its mission effectively, a military 
needs to be provided with adequate resources in 
terms of personnel, finances and weapons.2  Such in-
vestment in the armed forces may pay off as a devel-
opment dividend, but they also invariably represent a 
greater or lesser burden, as these resources are lack-
ing in other sectors, such as the health service. A mil-
itary that absorbs a large part of a society’s resources 
could hamper necessary structural economic and  
social change and cause development deficits in  
industry and agriculture.  
The GMI aims to provide data for a more nuanced 
debate about the role of militarisation that goes beyond 
the usual normative debates. Following a resource- 
based approach, the GMI understands militarisation  
 
 
1 \  We understand organised violence as all measures that a societal col-
lective uses to counter the problem of internal/ intra-societal violence.  
Yet, as social orders always need a modicum of violence to uphold the 
status quo, organised violence always encompasses both, measures to 
contain it and measures to use it.  This is why every social order cre-
ates norms that sanction internal/ intra-societal violence (‘murder is 
taboo’) and others that legitimise certain forms of violence under cer-
tain conditions.  At the institutional level, organised violence means 
the establishment of institutions of violence (such as police, army) 
that may use violence under certain circumstances to prevent or limit 
illegitimate private violence (see Schetter & Müller-Koné, 2021
2 \  We assume that other aspects, such as an effective control by a legiti-
mate government and military–societal relations which prevent the 
use of (miilitary) violence against one’s own people, also play an im-
portant role in the functionality of the military.
Introduction to the Global Militarisation Index and 
why it differs from other indices
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However, it should be emphasised that the GMI, 
especially in tandem with other indices, offers the 
chance to explore domestic or regional effects of mil-
itarisation, such as on security, prosperity or human 
development. The GMI thus addresses researchers, 
advisors or policymakers who are interested in re-
gional and domestic effects of militarisation and who 
are working on arms exports and global or regional 
dynamics of armament and conflict.  
Unit of analysis and inclusion/ 
exclusion criteria
The GMI is a global index, which means that it 
has the ambition to record the annual status of mili-
tarisation of every country in the world. Criteria, such 
as size or number of citizens, are irrelevant for this. 
This is why the current GMI ranking contains the Fiji 
Islands or Iceland; both countries with less than one 
million inhabitants. The only factor that restricts in-
clusion in the Index is the insufficient availability of 
(up-to-date) data—and this solely serves to secure the 
quality of the Index (see Note on missing data on 
page 13). 
Coverage
The GMI covers the period from 1990 to 2019 and 
currently comprises 151 countries. It is updated annu-
ally. Depending on the availability of data, coverage of 
the number of countries included in the Index may 
vary slightly from year to year.  
Publication
As the GMI is based on data made available exter-
nally, it is published retrospectively at the end of each 
year. The GMI 2020, for instance, was published in  
December 2020 and is based on data from 2019.  
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The concept of militarisation
Militarisation is both tied to the concepts of the 
military on the one hand and militarism on the other. 
In a narrower interpretation, militarisation is under-
stood as an increase in military capacity (Lind, 2004). 
Eide and Thee (1980, p. 9), for instance, proposed to 
understand militarisation as an “increase in arma-
ments, advance in the destructive capacity of weap-
ons, growing numbers of people under arms, and  
dramatic increases in military expenditure”. A broader 
interpretation looks at militarisation as a steady de-
velopment towards the state of militarism (see Levy, 
2015; Shaw, 1991). This is in line with Stearn’s defini-
tion of demilitarisation as a process of “reducing the 
role of the military in the political and social life—
with or without slimming the size of the military 
sector” (2013, pp. 23). By a combination of both inter-
pretations, militarisation can be considered as a multi- 
dimensional phenomenon, which consists of a mate-
rial, a political and a social dimension (Bowman, 
2002). Such an interpretation also includes a discur-
sive dimension that changes convictions and values 
of a society to such a degree that they legitimise the 
use of violence, the organisation and the financing of 
large, standing armies as well as the associated higher 
tax burden (Lutz, 2002, p. 723).
The GMI’s approach is resource-based and meas-
ures the level of militarisation by the allocation of  
resources by the state to the military in relation with 
other areas of society. By measuring the level of mili-
tarisation and the resulting time series annually,  
processes of militarisation or demilitarisation (see 
Wolpin, 1983, 130) of societies and regions can be 
mapped. This means, inter alia, that the GMI is not  
(or only an indirect) an indicator of military power.  
In other words: The most heavily militarised country 
is not automatically the most powerful in military 
terms. Besides material (heavy weapons) resources, 
the GMI also takes account of human resources and 
thus records the aspect of social militarisation. Mate-
rial militarisation measures the power resources in 
the hands of the military (Kühn & Levy, 2020) 
manifested in heavy weapons. Social militarisation is 
understood as the size of the military compared to the 
total population (Bullock & Firebaugh, 1990). In our  
approach, we relate the resources allocated to the mili-
tary to those allocated to the whole of society (see  
below). For instance, we consider resources allocated to 
the health sector as an indicator of human development.  
In the past, we have witnessed frequent expan-
sions of the concept of militarisation. At times, this 
concept is used to examine how military equipment is 
enhanced or how institutions, such as the police, adopt 
military tactics and attitudes (see Flores-Macias & 
Zarkin, 2019; Bieler, 2016). It can also serve to analyse 
private militarisation (Hutchful & Aning, 2001) as 
manifested by private military providers (Kinsey, 2006). 
In contrast to that, when looking at militarisation, we 
focus on the state and the military as its core institu-
tion of organised violence. In doing so, we include  
paramilitary units in our definition of the military, as 
the regular military alone does not adequately reflect 
the total size of the armed forces in many countries 
(see Personnel Index). 
Operationalisation
The GMI provides information on the level of mili-
tarisation. By analysing the level of militarisation, we 
can observe tendencies of an increase in or a scaling 
down of the military. This can be used to ask specific 
development policy and socio-political questions. Our 
Index ranks the countries according to their level of 
militarisation on a scale from 0 to 1,000 (whereby 1,000 
represents the highest level of militarisation). The GMI 
consists of three sub-indices that assess different  
aspects of militarisation, namely expenditures,  
personnel and heavy weapons.  These three sub-indices 
are made up of six indicators in total. 
How to measure militarisation?
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Expenditure Index (EI)
For a long time, military expenditures have been 
considered the standard measure of militarisation 
(Gifford, 2006, p. 473). Financial resources made availa-
ble by a government are a major factor that determines 
the ordnance, capabilities and size of a country’s 
armed forces. According to our relational approach, 
the EI relates the budget of the armed forces to two 
important indicators: For one, the economic perfor-
mance of a country and its society (measured as the 
gross domestic product, GDP), for another its govern-
ment’s spending on health. Data on military spending 
are sourced from the Military Expenditure Database 
of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute SIPRI. It is 
important to note that SIPRI uses a broad definition 
of military spending that goes beyond the defence 
budget of a country. It also includes other expenditures, 
such as pensions for military personnel or spending 
on military research and development. Even though 
SIPRI can be considered to be the most reliable 
source to date, data on military spending must be 
treated with the utmost caution. For many countries, 
in particular developing countries and autocratic 
states, the figures are only rough estimates. In those 
cases where SIPRI does not provide up-to-date data, 
we use the latest available figures, provided they are 
not older than three years. Data on health expendi-
tures is obtained from the Global Health Observatory 
Data Repository of the World Health Organization 
(WHO).
Both EI-indicators are calculated as follows:
Personnel Index (PI)
Besides military expenditures, we also use the 
Personnel Index (PI) to measure militarisation. The 
PI measures the level of “social militarisation” by the 
size of the military. It consists of three indicators: 
The first and most important indicator in this 
category is active (para-)military personnel set in  
relation to the total population. As mentioned above 
(see The concept of militarisation), we include para-
military personnel to adequately reflect the total size 
of the armed forces. The main criterion for coding an 
organisational unit as military or paramilitary is that 
the armed forces concerned are not only armed, wear 
uniforms and live in barracks but that they are also 
under the direct control of the government. Based on 
data of the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS), we count personnel in the army, the navy and 
the air force as well as additional (if applicable, such 
as from the coastguard, national guard or training 
commands) and paramilitary personnel. 
For a comprehensive presentation of the availa-
ble personnel and an appropriate presentation of the 
relative level of militarisation in society, a second  
indicator takes the percentage of reserve forces  
measured against the total population into account. 
This factor is particularly relevant for some countries, 
such as Switzerland, which have a comparatively 
small standing army but a larger amount of available 
reserves within society. We again rely on IISS data on 
military and paramilitary reserve forces. 
The third indicator compares the total number of 
military and paramilitary forces with the number of 
physicians in a country to express the ratio of mili-
tary to non-military expertise in a society. 
All data on military personnel is taken from the 
Military Balance of the International Institute for  
Strategic Studies (IISS). Population figures are taken 
from World Bank sources. The number of physicians 
of a country is taken from World Health Organization 
(WHO) data. 
Wer ist ausgereist, wer kommt zurück, was passiert 
nach der Rückkehr?
With milex_gdp being the “military expenditure as percentage of the 
GDP”, and health_gdp being the “health expenditure as percentage of 
the GDP”:
milex_health_norm := norm(log((milex_gdp / health_gdp) + 1))
and
norm(x) := (x – min(x)) / (max(x) - min(x))
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The HWI is calculated with the following 
formula:
Note on missing data
To ensure the overall quality of the Index, we only 
use original data from the sources indicated in the 
section on Operationalisation. This is why the Index 
does not contain any data based on expert assessments, 
extrapolation or other data projection methods.  
Beyond that, we strive to use data that are as up to 
date as possible. This is not always possible for various 
reasons: For one, such data is not always available or 
reliable (especially for fragile states). For example, the 
practice of using shadow armies that exist only on 
paper to divert their pay is common. For another, mil-
itary expenditures and troop numbers are sensitive 
topics that governments sometimes keep secret. To 
fill such data gaps, the GMI also uses data from previ-
ous years. Otherwise, the coverage of the Index would 
be extremely limited. To ensure that it nonetheless 
reflects actual developments in militarisation, we 
limit the use of data that are not up to date. For this, 
we use two thresholds: As military expenditure and 
personnel data, as well as the number of heavy weap-
ons, lie at the heart of the Index, this data must not 
be older than three years. Other data (such as on  
expenditures on health and number of physicians) 
must not be older than five years. 
This means that military expenditure and data 
on personnel as well as data on heavy weapons con-
tained in the GMI 2020 may refer to 2016, and the data 
on health expenditures and the number of physi-
cians may date back as far as 2014. If no data is availa-
ble, we will code this as missing data. Such missing 
data results in a ‘0’ score for the respective indicator 
in the GMI ranking. 
The three indicators of the PI are calculated  
according to the following formulas:
Heavy Weapons Index (HWI)
To determine the degree of “material militarisa-
tion” of a country, the GMI takes into account certain 
types of heavy weapons. The Heavy Weapons Index 
(HWI) indicates the number of heavy weapons in the 
arsenals of the armed forces in relation to the overall 
population. 
We define heavy weapons as any military equip-
ment that fits into one of four categories: Armoured 
vehicles (armoured personnel carriers3 , light tanks, 
main battle tanks), artillery (multiple rocket launch-
ers, self-propelled artillery systems, pulled artillery 
systems) of 100mm calibre and above, combat aircraft 
(combat helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft) and large 
vessels of war (submarines, principal surface combat-
ants larger than corvettes). We also count stockpiled 
weapons as they are part of the military potential of a 
country. Data on weapons holdings are compiled 
from the ISS Military Balance. Data on small arms 
and light weapons (SALW) is not only extremely dif-
ficult to come by but is also unreliable. This is why 
they are not included in the GMI. 
3 \  Including autonomous underwater vehicles, infantry combat vehicles, 
airborne combat vehicles and protected patrol vehicles. 
1. milpara_pop_norm := norm(log(milpara_pop + 1))
2. reserve_pop_norm := norm(log(reserve_pop + 1))
3. milpara_phy_norm := norm(log(milpara_phy + 1))
with
1. milpara_pop := milpara / population
2. milpara_phy := milpara / physicians
3. reserve_pop := reserve / population
and:
milpara := military + paramilitary
weapons_pop_norm := norm(log(weapons_pop +1)) 
weapons_pop := weapons * 100,000 / population (Number of heavy 
weapons per 100,000 inhabitants)
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Beyond this, we apply a general quality policy to 
the data for each country. As explained in more detail 
in the next section on the Methodology, the GMI 
score is the result of three sub-indices and six indica-
tors. Each indicator (like military spending as per-
centage of GDP) is weighted differently and then  
included in the overall GMI score. The already men-
tioned indicator “Military spending as percentage of 
GDP”, for instance, is one of the most important and 
is, therefore, weighted with a factor of five. As Table 1 
in the section on the methodology shows, the sum of 
all weighting factors for all six indicators is 20. If 
missing data results in a ‘0’ score of indicators with a 
total weighting factor of 10 or less, the corresponding 
country is excluded from the GMI ranking. However, 
if data coverage is sufficient, we will list these coun-
tries in the ranking of the sub-indices.
The Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea is an 
example of an excluded country. It is most likely the 
most heavily militarised country in the world. But it 
is an autocratic state that keeps its data, especially 
that on military spending, personnel and heavy 
weapons, strictly confidential. There is also no reliable 
data on Yemen, Syria, Qatar or Myanmar, which is 
why we do not include these countries in the GMI.
Methodology
The overall GMI represents a weighted sum of its 
six indicators. These are divided into three sub-indices: 
The Expenditure-, Personnel-, and Heavy Weapons 
Index. We consider expenditures and personnel as 
the two most important determinants of militarisa-
tion. Therefore, the indices on expenditure and per-
sonnel are weighted by a factor of two against the 
third index, which represents the heavy weapons in 
the arsenals of a country. This weighting is indirectly 
derived from the scores of the indicators belonging to 
the respective sub-index. As Table 1 below shows, the 
Expenditure Index is made up of two indicators 
(“military expenditures as percentage of GDP” and 
“military expenditures in relation to health spending”), 
which are given factors of five and three. This results 
in a total weighting factor of eight. Similarly, the total 
weighting factor of the Personnel Index is eight, and 
that of the Heavy Weapons Index is four. 
To increase compatibility between different indi-
cators and to prevent extreme values from creating 
distortions when normalising data, in a first step, 
each indicator is represented in a logarithm with a 
factor of 10. In a second step, all data are normalised 
using the formula x = (y-min) / (max-min), where 
min and max represent the lowest and the highest 
value of the logarithm respectively. In a third step, 
Kategory Indicator GMI weighting factor
Expenditures Military expenditures as percentages of GDP
Military expenditures in relation to health spending
5
3
Personnel Military and paramilitary personnel in relation to population
Military reservists in relation to population




Weapons Heavy weapons in relation to population 4
Table 1 
Indicators and weighting factors 
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each indicator is weighted in accordance with a sub-
jective factor, reflecting the relative importance at-
tributed to it by BICC researchers. To calculate the fi-
nal score, the weighted indicators are added up and 
then normalised one last time on a scale ranging 
from 0 to 1,000. 
In the GMI ranking, the countries are ranked  
according to their overall GMI score. The Expenditure, 
Personnel and Heavy Weapons Indices can also be 
ranked independently. These rankings allow us to 
also include countries that are not listed in the over-
all GMI score as such as a result of insufficient data. 
Table 2 
GMI ranking 2020
EI=Expenditure Index; PI=Personnel Index; HWI=Heavy Weapons Index
Country EI score PI score HWI score GMI score Rank
Israel 2.4 1.7 3.1 363.2 1
Armenia 2.2 1.7 2.3 310.1 2
Oman 3.4 0.9 1.8 305.6 3
Bahrain 2.1 1.3 2.6 300.8 4
Singapore 2.0 1.3 2.7 297.2 5
Saudia-Arabia 3.1 0.7 2.1 293.6 6
Brunei 2.3 1.5 1.9 286.7 7
Russia 2.1 0.9 2.7 285.1 8
Kuwait 2.6 0.6 2.4 284.2 9
Jordan 2.2 1.1 2.3 279.3 10
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Personnel Index (PI)
We use the following data sources for the  
Personnel Index:
mil = 181,400 (number of military personnel - IISS)
para = 0 (number of paramilitary personnel - IISS)
Reserve = 29,200 (number of reservists - IISS)
pop = 83,132,799 (total population – World Bank)
phy = 351,195 (number of physicians – WHO)
milpara_pop = (mil + para) / pop = 0.002182051
milpara_phy = (mil + para) / phy = 0.5165222
reserve_pop = reserve / pop = 0.0003512452
Now, we will calculate the shifted logarithm (to 
the base 10):
log(milpara_pop + 1) = 0.0009466203
log(milpara_phy + 1) = 0.1808488
log(reserve_pop + 1) = 0.001525171
Then, we will do the same for all countries and 
years and calculate the max and min values:
min max
log(milpara_pop + 1) 0 0.03632710
log(milpara_phy + 1) 0 3.310017
log(reserve_pop + 1) 0 0.11805287
As a last step, we apply the normalisation function 
(norm(x) = (x-min) / (max-min)):
PI1 = milpara_pop_norm = 0.02605824
PI2 = milpara_phy_norm = 0.05463681
PI3 = reserve_pop_norm = 0,.01291939
To make this Codebook a little easier to under-
stand, we will recapitulate in detail Germany’s GMI 
ranking for 2019, including its sub-indices. With an 
overall score of 114, Germany was ranked 106th in the 
GMI 2020, that is for the year 2019. On the valuation of 
the respective sub-indices, Germany’s ranking was as 
follows in 2019: 
1\  Expenditure Index: 0.96
2\  Personnel Index : 0.22
3\  Heavy Weapons Index: 1.12
To calculate the GMI for Germany for 2019, we calcu-
late the sub-indices separately and then aggregate the 
interim results.
Expenditure Index (EI)
The information from the respective data sources 
results in the following values: 
milex_gdp = 1.2795 (Military spending as percentage 
of GDP - SIPRI)
health_gdp = 11.2 (Health expenditures as percentage 
of GDP - WHO)
We will first calculate their ratio:
milex_health = milex_gdp / health_gdp = 0.114241071
In a second step, we will calculate the shifted loga-
rithm (to the base 10):
log(milex_gdp + 1) = 0.3578
log(milex_health + 1) = 0.0470
Now, we will do the same for all countries and 
years and determine the max and min values:
In a last step, we apply the normalisation function 
(norm(x) = (x-min) / (max-min)):
EI1 = milex_gdp_norm = 0.1726053
EI2 = milex_health_norm = 0.03077972
Model calculation
min max
log(milex_gdp + 1) 0 117.349
log(milex_health + 1 0 1.5263
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Heavy Weapons Index (HWI) 
For the Heavy Weapons Index, we use the follow-
ing data sources:
weapons = 3,485 (number of heavy weapons - IISS)
pop = 83,132,799 (total populatition – World Bank)
weapons_pop = 100,000 * weapons / pop = 4.192088
First, we will calculate the shifted logarithm (to 
the base 10):
log(weapons_pop + 1) = 0.7153420
Now, we repeat this step for all countries and 
years and calculate the max and min values:
As a final step, we apply the normalisation function 
(norm(x) = (x-min) / (max-min)):
HWI1 = weapons_pop_norm = 0.2793656
Aggregation
To complete the calculation, we multiply the  
interim results by the respective weighting factors, 
sum up the results and divide the result by the total 
weighting factor 20:
ALL = (5*EI1 + 3*EI2 + 4*PI1 + 2*PI2 + 2*PI3 + 4*HWI1) / 20 
= 0.1144459
Finally, we multiply the result by the factor 1,000:
GMI = ALL * 1000 = 114.4459
Data set
BICC makes the GMI publicly available in a  
reduced version (the GMI score including the sub- 
indices). You can access it here as a data set in 
csv-format for download. The Codebook in its current 
version can be found at  
https://gmi.bicc.de/#rank@2019de/#rank@2019
min max
log(weapons_pop + 1 0 2.560594
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State centredness
With the Peace of Westphalia, which put an end 
to the 30 Years War in 1648, the state with its standing 
armies became the main actor in warfare and thus 
the central factor in militarisation. Despite this 
prominent position, however, even in the heyday of 
state militarism and imperialism, it was never the 
only actor that led military troops into the battle. In 
other words: The state was never the undisputed  
monopolist of military violence. For example, private 
actors, such as the East India Trading Company 
(Clegg, 2017) supported and substituted national or 
state-run armed forces in conquering and securing 
colonial territories with their own military troops. 
Similarly, after the end of the East–West antagonism, 
a wave of liberalisation set in, which also affected the 
military sector and led to a proliferation of so-called 
private security (PSC) and private military companies 
(PMC) (Singer, 2007). This once again called into ques-
tion the central role of the state in the use of military 
violence and for processes of militarisation. For some 
years now, there has also been a discussion about the 
growing militarisation of police forces, which are  
increasingly adopting military tactics and equipment 
and are, thus, becoming more and more like the mili-
tary (Flores-Macias & Zarkin, 2019; Bieler, 2016). While 
this does not challenge state centricity, it does broaden 
the field of militarisation research beyond the armed 
forces as the central actor. Although we consider this 
broadening of the field to be appropriate, we still  
believe that the conceptual, narrow focus of the GMI 
on the state and its military is sensible for analytical 
reasons:  
First, countries and their armies continue to be 
by far the most important institutions of military 
violence with some 19.8 million people under arms, 
some 23.8 million reservists (IISS, 2021) and military 
expenditures of US $1,981 billion a year (SIPRI, 2020) 
and are likely to remain so.  
With the current Codebook of the GMI, we have 
presented our state-centred, relational resource ap-
proach to measuring militarisation. The Codebook de-
scribes not only the current concept of militarisation 
but also its operationalisation by the GMI. Both, con-
ceptionalisation and operationalisation are chal-
lenged by new developments in warfare. For example, 
the use of weaponised drones equipped with the 
latest reconnaissance and surveillance technology 
allows for targeted killings of individuals who are 
considered a threat to the security of a country or its 
population. Similar to cyberattacks on vital infra-
structure such as nuclear facilities, energy plants or 
communication infrastructure, such tactics are situ-
ated in the realm of so-called hybrid warfare and in 
the grey areas between classic definitions of war and 
peace.  
Moreover, new data sources offer the opportunity 
to further develop the Index. In this section, we 
would like to reflect on our approach and discuss pos-
sible options for its adaptation. We will elaborate in 
particular on the following three points: 
1\ the option to expand the Index to include private 
militarisation;
2\ the expansion of the Heavy Weapons Index and 
the possible inclusion of small arms and light 
weapons as well as new weapons systems, such 
as drones and military satellites;
3\ some thoughts on how to understand the nexus 
between organized violence and militarisation 
and on how to measure the later in a multi- 
dimensional way.
Discussion and development going forward
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Small arms and light weapons
First, many wars—particularly domestic wars—are 
waged primarily with small arms and light weapons 
(SALW)5 . SALW are also the most common means of  
repression against a state’s own population and, against 
this background, are probably the military’s most im-
portant resource in terms of organised violence. (On 
BICC’s concept of organised violence, cf. Militarisation 
and organised violence: Towards a multi-dimensional 
approach.) Despite their far-reaching relevance as a 
means of organised violence, the GMI has not recorded 
small arms and light weapons so far. The reason for this 
is a lack of reliable data. In contrast to major conven-
tional weapons systems, small arms and light weapons 
are more often traded illegally. At the same time, they 
are often manufactured locally, which makes further 
transfers unnecessary. These are the reasons why the 
GMI’s main source of information, the Military Balance, 
for instance, does not keep any data on small arms and 
light weapons. One of the few global data sources on 
small arms in possession of the military is the Small 
Arms Survey (SAS) of the Graduate Institute of Interna-
tional and Development Studies in Geneva. The Institute 
collects information on small arms holdings in the  
arsenals of the military for currently 177 countries. Its 
data sources used are information provided by states 
themselves to the Small Arms Survey, reports of states to 
the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) as well 
as estimates.6 The latter make up by far the largest part 




5 \  The United Nations define small arms and light weapons as follows: 
“Small arms” are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual 
use. They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles 
and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns 
“Light weapons” are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for use by 
two or three persons serving as a crew, although some may be carried 
and used by a single person. They include, inter alia, heavy machine 
guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, porta-
ble anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable 
launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers 
of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 
100 millimetres (United Nations, 2006). With the exception of grenades 
that are weapons and ammunition in one, all small arms need ammu-
nition.
6 \  It multiplies troop numbers with a modificator for different types of 
armies (people‘s war militaries, trinitarian militaries, constabulary, 
militaries, reserve militaries) and thus calculates the estimated num-
ber of small arms and light weapons (see Karp, 2018). 
Second, state armies differ significantly from oth-
er armed actors, such as private militias, armed par-
ties or movements or even the state police in their 
mission, methods of recruitment and embeddedness 
in society. 
The GMI will, therefore, continue to focus on the 
state military as the starting point of militarisation 
dynamics. In doing so, we assume that the military is 
embedded in a political regime or a society via its  
civil–military relations.4  Militarisation in the nar-
rower sense of the GMI—understood as the allocation 
of resources to the military in relation to other parts 
of society—always has an influence on other parts or 
institutions of society (such as the police) and their 
relations with each other. Thus, a change in resource 
allocation, by, for instance, introducing or suspending 
conscription and the accompanying downsizing of or 
increase in personnel, inevitably affects the regime 
and society (militarisation in the broader sense). We 
consider the conceptual differentiation and measure-
ment of these different dimensions of militarisation 
to be very important and strive towards this (see  
Militarisation and organised violence: Towards a 
multi-dimensional approach). For analytical reasons, 
we intend, however, to approach these separately while 
the GMI will continue to measure militarisation by 
way of a state- and military-centred approach.  
Small arms and light weapons as well 
as novel weapons systems
In its current design, the GMI records the material 
dimension of militarisation via the ratio of heavy 
weapons to the total population. With regard to arms 
dynamics and conventional interstate wars, this  
approach has proven to be effective. However, we 
would like to point out two problems of this limitation 
and offer possible solutions to these. 
4 \  Civi–military relations (CMR) in the broadest sense are understood as 
the relations between the military on the one hand and the civilian 
parts of society on the other. Understood like this, CMR cover both 
political elites and the wider population (Shields, 2015) on the civilian 
side.
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The British NGO Drone Wars also collects data on 
countries operating armed drones, but their list only 
contains 20 counties at present and thus deviates  
significantly from the data of the Drone Databook. 
Moreover, Drone Wars publishes on individual types 
of drones but not the number used by each country. 
The data from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, in 
turn, only covers exports and not domestic manufac-
ture. Against this background, including unmanned 
drones in the GMI requires a great deal of research. 
The Drone Databook could serve as a starting point, 
but it would have to be complemented by SIPRI’s data 
on drone exports and own research on manufacture. 
Still, we intend to include the ability to use armed 
drones in the GMI as of 2022. Given the data situation, 
this ability will be evaluated in four categories: no 
ability, little, medium and high ability. Unlike with 
the other heavy weapons, only a weighted estimate of 
capacities rather than an exact number of weapons 
systems will be included in the Index.  
The addition of cyberwar capacities to the GMI is 
also not without its challenges. These capacities are 
particularly relevant against the backdrop of so-
called hybrid warfare. In principle, there are two  
approaches to estimating/measuring the cyberwar 
capabilities of a country: For one, via existing struc-
tures or infrastructures for electronic warfare, for the 
other via concrete events that are ascribed to a cer-
tain actor.  
IISS resorts to the first approach in its Military 
Balance+, where it has been providing information 
on military cyber capabilities since 2021. These are 
collected / estimated through four indicators: Strategy 
and doctrine, principal military cyber units, defence 
satellite capability and national military cyber exer-
cises. This data, however, is still being gathered and is 
currently only available via the Military Balance+. 
Furthermore, this approach has the shortcoming that, 
most likely, only a fraction of the actual capabilities 
can be ascertained via the survey of official units, 
doctrines and drills and that in all likelihood the  
approach is subject to systematic distortions.      
estimates has been tested using some examples and has 
proven to be relatively reliable, before adopting this 
methodology, it remains to be examined to what extent 
it can also be applied retrospectively to the GMI.  
Novel weapons systems
Second, in the wake of hybrid (McCulloh & Johnson, 
2013), network centric (von Boemcken, 2008) or liquid 
(Mutschler, 2016) warfare and the revolution in mili-
tary affairs, both military technology and warfare has 
changed fundamentally. In view of this, novel weapons 
systems or military technology, for instance, play an 
increasingly important role. Military satellites have 
become indispensable for global navigation, recon-
naissance, communication and networking with  
different parts of the army as well as for the control of 
precision weapons. Unmanned drones, so-called UAVs 
(unmanned aerial vehicle) play an important role not 
only for reconnaissance but are increasingly used for 
air strikes and surveillance of large (maritime) spaces. 
Furthermore, cyberspace has become a new battle-
field. Militarisation, hence, also extends into digital 
space and includes a corresponding infrastructure.  
In all addressed areas, the problem is identifying 
reliable and annual data so that the respective weap-
ons systems can be included in the GMI. The situa-
tion is easiest with regard to satellites. Here, the USC 
Satellite Database provides an overview of currently 
2,787 satellites (status August 2020) of all kinds and 
differentiates between civilian and military satellites 
and the respective operators. This data is updated  
several times a year and represents both the most 
comprehensive and most reliable source with respect 
to satellites. Based on this data situation, we will  
likely be able to include military satellites with the 
next update into the GMI.   
For military drones, the situation is more compli-
cated. The Drone Databook published by Dan Gettinger 
and the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard  
College, New York is a well-researched and rather 
comprehensive data repository, which currently con-
tains 170 types of drones in 101 countries. However, 
the work of the Center ceased in 2021. Compared to 
the information in the Drone Databook, the data in 
the IISS Military Balance is much less comprehensive. 
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in the GMI only shows a part of civil–military rela-
tions and the dynamics of militarisation that influ-
ence them.  
Bowman (2002), for instance, argues that militari-
sation has three dimensions: A military, a political 
and a social one. The latter two dimensions are ex-
plored in civil–military relations. While most empiri-
cal work focuses on the relation between the military 
and political elites or the question of civilian or polit-
ical control of the military (Bruneau & Matei, 2008), 
so-called military–society relations (Rukavishnikov & 
Pugh, 2018, p. 128) are usually ignored. While civil–
military relations and civilian oversight are particu-
larly important in avoiding military coups or political 
interference by the military, the broader military– 
society relations play an important role in the con-
text of an evaluation of the role of the military as an 
institution of organised violence. For example, may 
the military be deployed within a country? Does it act 
as an organ of repression, or does it maintain a pro-
fessional distance from the ruling regime? (How) is 
the military embedded in wider society? Is there a 
regular exchange (for instance by conscription), or 
are the civilian and military spheres strictly separated 
from each other?
To be able to fully comprehend militarisation in 
its entirety and its complex implications on civil–
military relations and organised violence, we aim for 
a three-dimensional concept of militarisation, which 
could be covered by three indicators. While the GMI 
continues to record the material/military dimension, 
the Political Roles of the Military (PRM) dataset de-
veloped by Croissant et al. (2017) could cover the polit-
ical dimension and collect data on the influence of 
the military or rather the political control of the mili-
tary. Both could be complemented by a new Military–
Social Relations (MSR) Index, which addresses the 
questions mentioned above. Such a triad from GMI, 
PRM and MSR would not only allow us to identify  
different types of militarisation but to also study in 
more detail the complex interactions between the  
dimensions and their implications on violence and 
regime stability.  
The Cyber Operations Tracker of the Council on 
Foreign Relations has been recording state cyber  
attacks since 2005 and thus follows the second  
approach. The Tracker differentiates between attacks 
on the private sector, civil society, the government, or 
a country‘s military. This incidence data could be 
used to infer cyberwar capabilities. However, this is 
problematic in many respects: First, identifying the 
so-called threat actor—that is, the aggressor—is by no 
means easy, as the origins of the attacks are often  
obscured, and wrong leads are given. Second, language 
barriers during research lead to over-reporting of  
attacks on the English-speaking West. Third, and 
most seriously, only such cyberwar capabilities can 
be identified via incidences of cyber attacks that are 
actually deployed. All in all, the data situation is so  
inadequate that cyberwar capabilities will not be 
included in the GMI in the foreseeable future.  
Militarisation and organised violence: 
Towards a multi-dimensional approach
As mentioned at the beginning, research at BICC 
on militarisation is based on the concept of organised 
violence. Here, we assume that each social order is  
inscribed a modicum of violence that maintains it 
and is intended to counter the problem of internal  
violence. Modern states have created institutions of 
violence for this purpose, which monopolise the  
legitimate (use of) violence by the state to prevent or 
limit illegitimate, private violence (see Schetter & 
Müller-Koné, 2021). These institutions are accompa-
nied by norms that sanction certain manifestations 
of violence and legitimise others.  
Within modern national states, even though the 
state military is usually tasked with defending 
against external enemies, it also has the greatest  
potential for violence within society, closely followed 
by security forces such as the police or paramilitary 
units. To assess its role with respect to the organised 
violence inherent in a society, the military cannot be 
viewed in isolation from a) the ruling political regime 
and b) its relation to its own population. In other 
words: The relational resource-based approach used 
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